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Gold and Whitney: California Law Survey

SURVEY: WOMEN AND
CALIFORNIA LAW
by Victoria Gold* and Diane Whitney**

This survey of California case law and legislation is a regular
feature of the Women's Law Forum. The purpose of the Survey
is to summarize all California Supreme Court cases, Courts of
Appeal cases, and legislation enacted in the past year that is of
special importance to women. The focus of the Survey is on presenting issues most pertinent to women, rather than on analyzing
all issues raised in each case.
The survey period for cases in this issue is from August 1978
through May 1979. Summaries of legislation enacted up to September 30, 1978 are included in the fIrst issue of the Women's
Law Forum. *** Due to the small amount of completed legislative
action prior to printing time, no legislative summaries are included in this volume's Survey. A summary of signifIcant legislative action from October 1, 1978 to September 30, 1979 will be
included in the Survey of Volume 10, due for publication in the
Spring 1980, and in each issue of the Women's Law Forum
thereafter.

* Third Year Law Student, Golden Gate University School of Law
** Second Year Law Student, Golden Gate University School of Law
*** 8 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 583-662 (1979).
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1. CRIMINAL LAW

A. RAPE

AND

OTHER SEX OFFENSES

1. Certification and Sentencing of Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders
People v. Barnes, 84 Cal. App. 3d 745,148 Cal. Rptr. 824 (4th
Dist. 1978). After defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, he was examined psychiatrically and declared to be a
mentally disordered sex offender (MDSO). He received probation
after his sentence was suspended. Two years later when his probation was revoked, he was certified to the psychiatric department of the superior court and found to be an MDSO not amenable to treatment.
The court of appeal reversed the holding that certification as
an MDSO must be based on either a conviction of a sex offense
requiring registration as an MDSO under Penal Code section 290
or, alternatively, by clear proof that the offense was committed
primarily for purposes of sexual arousal or gratification. Welfare
and Institutions Code section 6302. Here the conviction for involuntary manslaughter did not satisfy the legal prerequisites for a
certification order.

t People v. Saffell, 87 Cal. App. 3d 157, 150 Cal. Rptr. 804
(4th Dist. 1978), hearing granted, February 1, 1979. The trial
court found defendant, charged with rape and sexual perversion,
to be a mentally disordered sex offender who was amenable to
treatment. Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section
6316.1, defendant was committed to a mental health facility for
the upper term for his offenses without time offfor good behavior.
The court of appeal, affirming the conviction but reversing
the commitment order, found that this sentencing scheme denied
equal protection to mentally disordered sex offenders amenable
to treatment since it provides harsher penalties for them than for
either non-mentally disturbed sex offenders or mentally disturbed sex offenders who are not amenable to treatment.

t Since the California Supreme Court has granted a hearing in this case, the court of
appeal opinion is of no force or effect and is no longer an authoritative statement of any
principle oflaw. 5 CAL. JUR. 2d, Appellate Review § 434 (1952), citing Knouse v. Nimocks,
8 Cal. 2d 482, 66 P.2d 438, (1937). Four such cases appear in this Survey for the sole
purpose of familiarizing the reader with issues presently pending before the high court.
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Psychiatric Exam of Victim

People v. Mills, 87 Cal. App.3d 302, 151 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1st
Dist. 1978). In a prosecution for rape, after a jury had been empaneled and sworn, the trial court entered a judgment of dismissal
in favor of defendant because the alleged victim had refused to
undergo a court ordered psychiatric examination. The court of
appeal reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion
in dismissing the action. The court held that although the trial
court has the power to order a psychiatric examination of a victim
of a sex crime, the sanctions for refusal to cooperate are limited
and do not extend to forcing the victim to submit to an exam by
the court'S' contempt power. (Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal.
2d 159, 410 P.2d 838, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1966).) The court also
held that the prosecutor acted properly in advising the victim of
her right to refuse a psychiatric examination. Finally, the court
held that although the jury had been empaneled and sworn before
the cause was dismissed, and the defendant placed in jeopardy,
since the defendant had consented to the dismissal, a waiver of
double jeopardy was implied.
In re Leonard M., 85 Cal. App. 3d 887, 149 Cal. Rptr. 791
(2nd Dist. 1978), hearing denied, January 3, 1979. A sixteen year
old boy was made a ward of the juvenile court upon a finding that
he had committed a lewd act on a five year old girl. The boy
appealed the case primarily on the ground that his defense attorney had inadequately represented him by failing to order a
Ballard examination of the victim.
The court of appeal affirmed, holding that there was nothing
in the record to suggest that the boy's attorney had not made a
reasoned tactical decision in foregoing the Ballard motion.

3.

Rape as Great Bodily Injury/Bodily Harm

People v. Sargent, 86 Cal. App.3d 148, 150 Cal. Rptr. 113
(4th Dist. 1978), hearing denied, January 18, 1979. Judgments of
conviction for forcible rape and first degree burglary were affirmed; however, the judgment that defendant was sane at the
time of the offense was reversed because the trial court instructed
the jury on the M'Naughten test rather than the American Law
Institute test of sanity. The court of appeal further held that the
trial court erroneously instructed the jury that forcible rape itself
constituted great bodily injury. People v. Caudillo, 21 Ca1.3d 562,
Women's Law Forum
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580 P.2d 274, 146 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1978). But the facts that, as a
result of the rape, the victim became pregnant and suffered an
abortion, were significant and substantial physical injuries sufficient to demomstrate great bodily injury. The error did not compel reversal because the jury would have found great bodily injury
with or without the erroneous instruction.

People v. Lindsay, 84 Cal. App. 3d 851, 149 Cal. Rptr. 47
(2nd Dist. 1978). Defendant was convicted of burglary, oral copulation by force, and forcible rape. The jury found, pursuant to an
instruction that commission of forcible rape or oral copulation
alone could constitute great bodily injury, that defendant intentionally inflicted great bodily harm during the burglary. The
prosecution was allowed to introduce evidence that defendant's
blood type was the same as that found on the victim. The court
of appeal modified the judgment by striking findings of great
bodily injury pursuant to People v. Caudillo, 21 Cal.3d 562, 580
P.2d 274, 146 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1978) and affirmed.
People v. Hawk, 91 Cal. App. 3d 938, 154 Cal. Rptr. 773 (3rd
Dist. 1979). A defendant who pleaded guilty to rape by force,
violence and threat and admitted inflicting great bodily injury on
the victim was sentenced to the upper term of five years for rape
and an additional three years for inflicting great bodily injury.
Defendant appealed on the grounds that the court had erroneously used the great bodily injury conviction to enhance the
sentence for rape.
The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the trial court's
finding that the defendant showed "viciousness and callousness,"
apart from the infliction of great bodily injury, was supported by
evidence that, in addition to stabbing the victim, the defendant
choked and hit her, had her submit to an act of oral copulation
before raping her and kicked her afterwards.

4.

Separate Sentencing for Multiple Sex Offenses

People v. Perez, 23 Cal. 3d 545, 591 P.2d 63, 153 Cal. Rptr.
40 (1979). Defendant was convicted of, among other offenses, forcible rape, forcible sodomy, two counts of forcible oral copulation
and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. The trial court sentenced the defendant for rape but stayed
execution of the sentences for sodomy and oral copulation on the
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grounds that Penal Code section 654 prohibits punishment for
more than one violation arising out of a given act.
The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
applicability of Penal Code section 654 depends upon whether the
defendant acted with single or multiple objectives. The trial
court's determination that the defendant's single objective was to
obtain sexual gratification was too broad and violated the statute's purpose of ensuring that punishment is commensurate with
the defendant's culpability. The court held that punishment for
each of the offenses was not precluded by Penal Code section 654
since: 1) none of the offenses was committed as a means of committing any other, 2) none facilitated commission of any other
and 3) none was incidental to the commission of any other.

5.

Evidence of Rape Victim's Prior Sexual Experience

People v. Nemie, 87 Cal. App. 3d 926, 151 Cal. Rptr. 32 (3rd
Dist. 1978), hearing denied, February 1, 1979. The defendant,
who was convicted of forcibly raping a seventeen year old girl,
attacked the conviction based on the court's denial of his request
for a hearing to determine whether the victim had enough prior
sexual experience to know whether sexual penetration occurred.
The court of appeal found that the trial court properly exercised its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 denying the
request. Although the victim's face was covered during the attack, there was no showing by the defendant that prior sexual
experience was necessary in order for a rape victim to know what
type of object had penetrated her vagina.

6.

Evidence of Minor's Knowledge of Wrongfulness

In re Tony C., 21 Cal. 3d 888, 582 P.2d 957, 148 Cal. Rptr.
366 (1978). A juvenile court's finding that a minor boy should be
adjudged a ward of the court as a result of a rape by threat of
great bodily injury was challenged on the ground that Penal Code
section 26, subdivision (1) requires that a minor under fourteen
must be shown to have known that his or her act was wrongful.
The California Supreme Court affirmed the order sustaining the
petition alleging rape, concluding that the boy recognized that his
act was wrongful by his need to resort to threats of deadly force,
and that he took his victim to a secluded location and asked, after
raping her, if she intended to call the police. Also at issue was
Women's Law Forum
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Penal Code section 262 which requires that the physical ability
of the accused to accomplish penetration must be proved as an
independent fact and beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the presence of seminal fluid and sperm, which was revealed in a physical
examination of the victim shortly after the rape, was held to be
sufficient evidence of physical ability.

B.

PROSTITUTION

Discovery Requests Allowed Where Defendant Alleges Discriminatory Enforcement

1.

People v. Municipal Court (Street), 89 Cal. App. 3d 739, 153
Cal. Rptr. 69, (1st Dist. 1979). Three woman defendants were
charged with violations of various penal code sections relating to
prostitution (Penal Code sections 315, 318, and 647 subdivision
(b». They filed a pretrial motion to dismiss and a supplemental
motion for discovery alleging denial of equal protection because
the charges resulted from intentional, purposeful discrimInatory
law enforcement. The defendants alleged that their discovery requests would provide information to support their motion to dismiss. Defendants' declarations alleged, on information and belief,
that the district attorney had a policy of enforcing these penal
code statutes against women who were allegedly involved in heterosexual prostitution, but not against male homosexuals when
the violations occurred in certain commercial establishments.
The trial court granted the requests for discovery; however, the
prosecution successfully sought a writ of mandate in the superior
court directing the municipal court to vacate its order on grounds
that the court had exceeded its jurisdiction.
The court of appeal vacated the superior court's order and
reinstated the municipal court's order granting discovery. The
court held that a defendant may raise a claim of intentional and
purposeful discrimination in the enforcement of penal statutes,
and that (s)he may obtain a pretrial discovery order requiring the
prosecutor to produce information relevant to that claim. Murgia
v. Municipal Court, 15 Cal. 3d 286, 540 P .2d 44, 124 Cal. Rptr.
204 (1975).
The court, rejecting the prosecution's contention, held that
the defendants had demonstrated a plausible justification for discovery to support their claim of invidious discrimination where
they alleged the intentional enforcement against a class of indi-
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viduals was based on arbitrary sex classification. The court further held that the discovery requests specifically related to the
defense asserted and sought only statistical and other documentary information. Thus the request did not present a circumstance (i.e., privileged information) where criminal discovery
should be denied.
2.

Sufficiency of Evidence for Conviction of Pandering

People v. White, 89 Cal. App. 3d 143, 152 Cal. Rptr. 312 (2nd
Dist. 1979). Defendant was convicted under Penal Code section
266i for procuring a place in a house of prostitution for a sixteen
year old girl. On appeal the defendant charged that he was denied
due process since the prosecution did not rely on any specific act
of prostitution to' constitute violation of the statute.

The court of appeal upheld the conviction, noting first that
the offense was completed by the defendant's act of procuring a
place for the girl and second that there was sufficient evidence
based on her testimony that: 1) he had advised her she would be
engaging in various sexual acts and told her what to charge and
2) that she engaged in over one thousand sexual acts during the
four or five months that she worked for him.

C.

HOMICIDE

1. Relevance of Husband's Prior Threats to Wife's Claim of Self
Defense

People v. Bush, 84 Cal. App. 3d 294, 148 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1st
Dist. 1978). Defendant stabbed her husband during the course of
an assault by him against her and was charged with murder under
Penal Code section 187. Upon completion of evidence, the trial
court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss first and second
degree murder charges whereupon the jury convicted the defendant of involuntary manslaughter under Penal Code section 192,
subdivision (2).

Because there was uncontradicted evidence that in the
course of two prior beatings the victim had threatened to kill his
wife, the court of appeal found prejudicial error in the trial court's
refusal to give requested instructions to the jury that one who has
been so threatened may take quicker and stronger measures to
protect herself during an assault than one who has not received
such threats. In addition, the admission of evidence that the deWomen's Law Forum
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fendant knew she was the beneficiary of her husband's life insurance policy was found to be reversible error. In view of the fact
that the trial court granted a dismissal of first and second degree
murder charges, eliminating the question of malice aforethought
as a matter of law, the court of appeal considered that testimony
concerning the insurance policy could only confuse the jurors and
thus should have been excluded under Evidence Code section
352.

2. Failure to Charge in Commitment Order
People v. Superior Ct. (Grilli), 84 Cal. App. 3d 506, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 740 (1st Dist. 1978), hearing denied, October 25, 1978. A
defendant, charged with attempted murder, rape by force and
threat, oral copulation and false imprisonment was granted a
motion to dismiss the attempted murder charge because this
charge was not named in the commitment order at the preliminary hearing. The court of appeal issued a unit of mandate setting
aside the order since the preliminary hearing evidence showed
that the attempted murder charge was based on probable cause.
Thus, despite the failure to name the charge in the commitment
order, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in dismissing the
charge.
Also at issue in the case was the defendant's motion to dismiss allegations of great bodily harm as to each of the counts
charged. Once again the trial court granted the motion and the
appellate court reversed, holding that since Penal Code section
12022.7 does not define a separate offense but merely provides for
an additional three-year sentence where great bodily injury is
inflicted during the commission of the felony charged, it cannot
be subject to a motion for dismissal under Penal Code section 995.
II. FAMILY

LAW

A.

WRONGFUL DEATH AND NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS

1.

Elements of Emotional Distress for Death of Fetus

Austin v. Regents of University of California, 89 Cal. App.
3d 354, 152 Cal. Rptr. 420 (2nd Dist. 1979). A husband, brought
an action against the Regents of the University of California and
a doctor for injuries suffered as a result of the death of his wife
during delivery of their child, and the subsequent death of the
unborn child. The trial court entered summary judgment for de-
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fendants on the cause of action for emotional distress resulting
from the death of the child. The court also dismissed the causes
of action for wrongful death of the child and for breach of defendant's alleged contract to perform delivery of the fetus.
The court of appeal, in a 2-1 decision, reversed the judgment
as to the cause of action for emotional distress holding that the
husband had stated a triable cause of action by sufficiently pleading the three required elements of Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728,
441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) .. Plaintiff alleged that he
learned of the death by his own observation of the cessation of life
in the fetus and that his shock was caused by the sensory and
contemporaneous realization of the death. The other two required
elements (presence at the scene and close relationship to the victim) were not disputed. The Court of Appeal unanimously affirmed the dismissals of the causes of action for wrongful death
and breach of contract and the striking of punitive damages
against the University of California pursuant to Government
Code section 818.
The dissent, relying on Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564,
565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977), stated that Justus imposes
a fourth factor for a cause of action for emotional harm in witnessing an accident: that plaintiff must be an involuntary witness and
is denied recovery if he is a voluntary witness to the accident. The
dissent assumed that plaintiff was voluntarily in the delivery
room.

2.

Plaintiff's Inability to Identify the Manufacturer of DES

t Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 85 Cal. App. 3d 1, 149 Cal.
Rptr. 138 (2nd Dist. 1978), modified, 86 Cal. App. 3d 416a,
hearing granted, Dec. 13, 1978. Two women brought suit for personal injuries allegedly resulting from prenatal exposure to the
drug diethylstilbestrol (DES) manufactured by one or more of the
named defendants. The complaints alleged that DES, ingested
by plaintiffs' mothers as a miscarriage preventative, caused
t Since the California Supreme Court has granted a hearing in this case, the court of
appeal opinion is of no force or effect and is no longer an authoritative· statement of any
principle oflaw. 5 CAL. JUR. 2d, Appellate Review § 434 (1952), citing Knouse v. Nimocks,
8 Cal. 2d 482, 66 P.2d 438, (1937). Four such cases appear in this Survey for the sole
purpose of familiarizing the reader with issues presently pending before the high court.
Women's Law Forum
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plaintiffs to develop precancerous and cancerous tumors and lesions. Plaintiffs alleged that there existed a common and mutually agreed-upon formula for the drug, that the various brands
of DES were marketed by defendants as being fungible and interchangeable with all other brands of the drug and that there was
a pharmaceutical practice of filling prescriptions of DES with a
brand other than that prescribed.
The trial court sustained demurrers and dismissed the actions on the ground that no specific manufacturer was named as
the party responsible for plaintiffs' injuries. The court of appeal
reversed holding that it was unnecessary to identify the specific
manufacturer where plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to satisfy
pleading requirements in order to hold defendants jointly liable
on a concerted action theory and/or to shift the burden to defendants on an alternative liability theory. Also, the court held that
the applicable statute of limitations is Code of Civil Procedure
section 340 subdivision 3 providing for one year from the time the
plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered, that she
has been damaged by defendant's product.
McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 730 (3rd Dist. 1978), modified on denial of rehearing, 88
Cal. App. 3d 767h. Plaintiff brought an action for negligence and
for strict liability against one of 142 manufacturers of the drug,
diethylstilbestrol (DES) for a cervical cell disorder which she
alleged was attributable to her mother's use of DES to prevent
miscarriage during pregnancy in 1953. Plaintiff alleged that the
drug had been negligently tested, manlJ.factured, and marketed
and that it had been defective, falsely labeled, and that the risks
of the drug had been misrepresented. The plaintiff was unable to
identify the specific pharmaceutical compound or the specific
manufacturer of DES taken by her mother. The trial court
granted summary judgment for defendant.
The court of appeal affirmed, holding that under either negligence or strict liability, plaintiff has the burden of proving the
identity of the tortfeasor. For the first time on appeal plaintiff
asserted a theory that all manufacturers of DES are jointly and
severally liable because each acted in concert with the other.
Since plaintiff faile"d to plead concert of action at the trial level,
the case was distinguishable from the factually similar case of
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 85 Cal. App. 3d 1, 149 Cal. Rptr.
138, hearing granted, Dec. 13, 1978.
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Finally, the court held that strict liability will not be imposed on a manufacturer of new or experimental drugs when unfortunate consequences occur if the drug has been properly prepared and proper warning is given, and if the potential social
gains justify its use despite recognized medical risks.

3.

Governmental Immunity for Parole Determinations

Martinez v. State of California, 85 Cal. App. 3d 430,149 Cal.
Rptr. 519 (4th Dist. 1978). Plaintiff brought a suit against the
state and certain correctional employees for the wrongful death
of his daughter who was murdered by a mentally disordered sex
offender on parole. The suit, which alleged negligence in the release of the prisoner, was dismissed when defendants demurred
on the grounds of governmental immunity.
The court of appeal affirmed the decision based on Government Code section 845.8 which provides that public entities and
employees are not liable for any injury resulting from a parole
determination or caused by an escaped prisoner,· arrested person
or person resisting arrest. The court noted that this immunity
does not apply to ministerial acts in carrying" out the decision to
release a prisoner but since the complaint did not allege any
negligence occurring after the decision the complaint had been
properly dismissed.

4.

Loss of Consortium Due to Husband's Paralysis

Rodriquez v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 87 Cal. App. 3d 626,
151 Cal. Rptr. 399 (2nd Dist. 1978), modified 88 Cal. App. 3d
•
767c, hearing denied, March 29, 1979. A minor issue in this personal injury action was whether or not a wife should be awarded
five-hundred thousand dollars for loss of consortium when her
twenty-two year old husband was rendered triplegic by a job related accident. The court of appeal upheld the trial court's finding that the award was proper, noting that loss of consortium
includes loss of love, companionship, affection, and sexual relations as well as loss of support or services.

B.

INHERrrANcE DETERMINATIONS

1.

Community Property Interest in Partnership

Kenworthy v. Hadden, 87 Cal. App. 3d 696, 151 Cal. Rptr.
169 (3rd Dist. 1978). The executor of a decedent's estate filed a
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complaint for declaratory relief seeking a declaration that the
devisees of decedent's wife had no claim against decedent's estate
because they failed to file a timely money claim as creditors in
probate proceedings pursuant to Probate Code sections 707 and
732. The decedent husband had used community property to
enter a partnership. Following his wife's death, her community
property interest in the partnership (one-half of husband's onehalf interest) went to the devisees under her will, and thereafter
at all times the husband paid the devisees their share of profits
and proceeds, e.g., one-fourth interest in the partnership. The
trial court ordered the executor to account for and pay over to the
devisees one-fourth interest in the partnership upon liquidation
and winding up.
The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the devisees of a
wife's community property interest in her husband's partnership
held a present, existing interest in the partnership that entitled
them to share in its income and surplus, and did not have a
general creditor's claim against the estate. The court found that
Corporations Code section 15025, which clarifies the character of
a partnership, does not characterize the nature of the partnership
interest as between husband and wife, which may still be community property despite the statute. Therefore, the court ruled
that the devisees having a present existing interest in the partnership need not present a creditor's money claim under Probate
Code section 707 and were entitled to claim as owners of one-half.
of the husband's partnership interest.

2. Actions Authorized Against Surviving Spouse Under Probate
Code Section 205
Spurr v. Spurr, 88 Cal. App. 3d 614, 151 Cal. Rptr. 813 (4th
Dist. 1979). Under a divorce decree, a father was required to
maintain a $15,000 life insurance policy in favor of his daughter.
Mter his death, the daughter sought to recover the $15,000 from
her father's second wife on the theory of constructive trust. The
daughter alleged that her father did not maintain the life insurance in his second wife's favor, and that his wife had received the
money as a beneficiary. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendant because the plaintiff failed to establish the
elements of a constructive trust.
The court of appeal reversed, holding that the complaint
stated a cause of action under Probate Code section 205 which
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authorizes an action against the surviving spouse, in lieu of an
action against the estate, where the deceased spouse's assets have
not been subjected to formal probate administration. Thus, the
plaintiff did not have to establish the elements of a constructive
trust: reliance on a mistaken legal theory did not justify entry of
judgment against her. The court further held that since defendant, in her declaration in support of her motion for summary
judgment, did not establish any defense to an action pursuant to
Probate Code section 205, there remained triable issues of fact.

3. ,Effect of Spouse-Beneficiary's Untimely Death on Inheritance Tax Question
Estate of Logan, 84 Cal. App. 3d 717,148 Cal. Rptr. 819 (2nd
Dist. 1978). The trial court decided that no inheritance tax was
owed on the portion of decedent's estate which he had put in trust
for the benefit of his wife. The wife had died while the estate was
still in administration, but before the trust had been established
or before the wife's power of appointment was exercised. 'The
court of appeal reversed, holding that the transfer of the general
power of appointment created an immediate interest in the wife
at the time of her husband's death and although she did not have
the opportunity to exercise this power before her death, the estate
was not exempt from inheritance taxes.
4. Severance of Joint Tenancy by Property Settlement Agreement
Estate of Asvitt, 92 Cal. App. 3d 348, 154 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1st
Dist. 1979). At issue was whether a joint tenancy deed between a
decedent and his former wife had been severed by a property
settlement agreement which provided that the family home
would be sold either when the former wife remarried, the youngest child reached majority or at any time the parties mutually
agreed. The trial court found that the joint tenancy had been
severed and that the decedent's interest in the home should,
therefore, pass to an unrelated person who was the sole beneficiary named in his will.
The court of appeal affirmed, holding that interference with
the right of survivorship, one of the four essential unities of a joint
tenancy, severs the joint tenancy. The court further held that
agreements to sever are effective and the-intervening death of one
of the parties before the agreement is performed does not defeat
the severance.
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COMMUNITY PROPERTY

Community Interest in Retirement Benefits And Pension
Plans
1.

Johns v. Retirement Fund Trust, 85 Cal. App. 3d 511, 149
Cal. Rptr. 551 (4th Dist. 1978). In a dissolution proceeding, the
trial court ordered the husband's retirement fund trust to pay
directly to the wife her one-half interest in the retirement payments. The retirement fund refused, claiming under federal
preemption it was required to pay the benefit solely to the husband and the wife was required to collect ·from him. The record
indicated the benefits were 100 percent community prop~rty,
listed in the husband's name and were entirely vested.
The fund, not the husband, appealed. The court of appeal
affirmed, holding that the federal Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) does not preempt California lawas applied
here in matrimonial matters. The court also held that the
spendthrift features of ERISA were not applicable to the wife,
since she was an owner, not a creditor.

In re Marriage of Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d 113,152 Cal. Rptr.
362 (1st Dist. 1979), modification of opinion on denial of
rehearing, 93 Cal. App. 3d 474a, hearing denied, April 12, 1979.
Three cases, consolidated on appeal, were brought in connection
with marriage dissolution proceedings when non-employee
spouses (wives) sought orders directing the employee spouses'
pension fund to pay the community property share of benefits
directly to each of them. In one action, judgment was entered
dismissing the fund; in the other two actions the fund was ordered
to pay a specified portion directly to the non-employee spouses.
The court of appeal reversed the judgment dismissing the
fund with directions to enter judgment in favor of the nonemployee spouse. The other judgments were affirmed. The court
rejected the fund's contention that the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) pre-empted state law. The
court held that although the purpose of ERISA was to assure that
pension rights were "real" and to protect those rights from state
interference, Congress did not intend to preclude the states from
effectuating a fair division of community property pension benefits between former spouses. The court noted that the integrity
of the fund remains unaffected by the division of assets in a
dissolution proceeding. The court further held that there was no
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requirement here to exhaust administrative remedies by application to the fund's trustees since their decision was certain to be
adverse. Finally, the court held that the ERISA restriction on
assignment or alienation of pension benefits does not prohibit
division of community property benefits between an employee
and his former spouse who is an owner, not a creditor.

In re Marriage of Johnston, 85 Cal. App. 3d 900, 149 Cal.
Rptr. 798 (2nd Dist. 1978). The administrators of a husband's
pension plans were joined as parties in a dissolution proceeding.
Th~y contended that they were not required to pay pension benefits directly to a non-employee spouse because the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which they claimed
preempted California's community property laws, forbade any
such assignment of benefits. The trial court ordered that the benefits be paid directly to the wife but also authorized a deduction
of five dollars per month for administrative costs.
The court of appeal affirmed that part of the judgment which
ordered direct payment to the spouse holding that Congress did
not intend to preempt state domestic relations laws and that a
spouse's claim to her share of community property, including
pension plans, does not involve an assignment but is merely an
assertion of an ownership right. The court reversed that part of
the judgment which allowed a deduction for administrative costs
on the grounds that no excess administrative costs had been demonstrated.

In re Marriage of Kasper, 83 Cal. App. 3d 388,147 Cal. Rptr.
821 (2nd Dist. 1978) hearing denied, Sept. 27, 1978. A husband
appealed the trial court's decision in a dissolution proceeding
that: 1) he could keep the full interest in his retirement fund
while his wife kept the family home; and 2) that he must also pay
attorney fees and costs. The court of appeal affirmed, holding
that the trial court properly used the present value of the stream
of payments over the husband's 'life expectancy in calculating the
community property interest in the retirement plan. Also, it was
within the trial court's discretion to give the entire interest in the
retirement fund to the husband while awarding other assets of
equal value to the wife. The costs and attorney fees award was
held proper since there was a considerable disparity in the income
of the two spouses and the wife, who was caring for an emotionally
disturbed daughter, was expected to have higher living costs.
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In re Marriage of Borges, 83 Cal. App. 3d 771, 148 Cal. Rptr.
118 (1st Dist. 1978) hearing denied, Oct. 25, 1978. In an interlocutory judgment of dissolution, the settlement agreement incorporated into the judgment provided for the division of any assets
which were later determined to be community property. At the
time of the judgment the husband's retirement benefits from private employment were not taken into account due to a mistaken
belief that he had no vested rights in them. Two years later the
wife, having discovered this error, obtained an order to show
cause why the husband should not have to pay half the value of
the retirement benefit over to her. At the hearing, the wife's counsel, rather than seeking the remedy of enforcement provided for
in the agreement, instead asked for a modification of the dissolution decree which would treat the retirement benefits as a community asset. The trial court denied the modification.
The court of appeal affirmed, holding that it was not error
for the trial court to deny modification since no basis for modification was shown to exist and agreed with the trial court that, in
asking for modification, the wife had impliedly abandoned the
existing remedy of enforcement. The court refused to rule on the
husband's contention that any interest the wife might have in the
retirement plan was extinguished upon her death noting that,
although this rule is applied to public retirement plans, its applicability to a private plan would have to be determined by the
trial court after careful analysis of both the plan and the circumstances of the parties.
2. Social Security Benefits Characterized as Community Property

t In re Marriage of Hillerman, 88 Cal. App. 3d 372, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 764 (4th Dist. 1979), hearing granted, April 12, 1979 and
cause retransferred to court of appeal for reconsideration in light
of Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, __ U.S. __, 99 S. Ct. 802, 59
L.Ed. 2d 1 (1979). In a dissolution proceeding, the trial court
found that the husband's social security benefits were not community property and that no community interest existed in the
benefits despite the. stipulation of the parties that during their
marriage the husband's contributions to the social security syst Since the California Supreme Court has granted a hearing in this case, the court of
appeal opinion is of no force or effect and is no longer an authoritative statement of any
principle oflaw. 5 CAL. JUR. 2d, Appellate Review § 434 (1952), citing Knouse v. Nimocks,
8 Cal. 2d 482, 66 P .2d 438, (1937). For such cases appear in this Survey for the sole purpose
of familiarizing the reader with issues presently pending before the high court.
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tem were made with community funds. Accordingly, the trial
court did not retain jurisdiction to divide the benefits. The trial
court based its decision upon the authority of In re Marriage of
Kelley, 64 Cal. App. 3d 82, 134 Cal. Rptr. 259 (2nd Dist. 1976),
which rejected the argument that sodal security benefits are a
divisible community asset.
The court of appeal reversed, holding that the trial court
should have reserved jurisdiction for the purpose of dividing the
husband's social security benefits. The court held that neither
state nor federal law barred recognition of a community interest
in social security benefits. When contributions of community
funds or labors have qualified a married person for benefits, a
community property interest in those benefits exists at the time
of the dissolution of marriage. The court noted the difficulties in
tracing benefits to the contributed community assets as well as
the difficulty in the valuation of the benefits. Nonetheless, the
court held that Congress, by enacting the Social Security Act, did
not intend to interfere 'with a state court's jurisdiction over distribution of marital property at dissolution of marriage. The court
of appeal ordered the opinion unpublished.

3.

Military Pension Rights

In re Marriage of Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d 779,582 P.2d 96, 148
Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978). When a retired serviceman may elect to receive either a disability pension or a retirement pension, only the
excess disability rights are properly the husband's separate property. In a divorce proceeding the balance of pension rights acquired during the marriage replace ordinary "retirement" pay
and thus are classed as a community asset. In a six to one decision, the California Supreme Court (Clark dissenting) affirmed
this division of marital property; otherwise a serviceman could
defeat the community interest in his right to a pension by his
unilateral election. The court reversed the judgment to the extent
that the trial court limited its jurisdiction to modify spousal support to twenty-four months. The high court held this to be an
abuse of discretion because the record indicated a twenty-five
year marriage and there was no evidence concerning future earnings or employment opportunities for either husband or wife,
which would support any assertion that the wife would attain
economic self-sufficiency within that twenty-four-month period.
Sangiolo v. Sangiolo, 87 Cal. App. 3d 511, 151 Cal. Rptr. 27
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(4th Dist. 1978). Though both parties in a dissolution proceeding
were aware of the husband's vested military retirement benefits,
no reference was made to them because of legal uncertainty as to
whether they were considered community property. The original
petition noted that there was additional community property, the
exact nature of which was unknown and asked for leave to amend
when its nature was ascertained. Six and one-half years later the
wife filed an action for partition and an accounting and the trial
court sustained the husband's demurrer on the grounds of the
statute of limitations, laches and res judicata. The court of appeal reversed holding that: 1) no statute of limitations applies to
an action for a partition and an accounting; 2) since the court had
not been made aware of the retirement benefits they could not
divide them an9. thus res judicata did not apply; and 3) laches
was not grounds for sustaining a demurrer since it was unclear
when the wife learned of her community interest in these benefits
and there was no suggestion that the delay was prejudicial to the
husband.

Gorman v. Gorman, 90 Cal. App. 3d 454, 153 Cal. Rptr. 479
(4th Dist. 1979), hearing denied, May 10, 1979. A former wife
brought separate actions against her former husband for division
of the community interest in his military retirement benefits and
against her attorney for failure to assert that interest during the
dissolution proceedings. The trial court awarded the wife her
community interest in the retirement plan and assessed only
nominal damages of one dollar against the attorney on the
grounds that the loss occassioned by his negligence was completely offset by the judgment against the husband. •
The court of appeal affirmed the judgment against the husband noting that the doctrine of res judicata did not bar the
action since the issue of military retirement benefits was not addressed or adjudged in the earlier dissolution proceeding. But
since there was no certainty that the wife could enforce the judgment against her ex-husband, the court of appeal modified the
judgment against the attorney holding the attorney liable in the
same amount as the former husband, and awarded, costs, with
credit for any amount the former husband actually paid as a
result of the judgment. The court also distinguished the recent
U.S. Supreme Court case, Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, __ U.S.
_ , 99 S. Ct. 802, 59 L. Ed.2d 1 (1979).

Bridges v. Bridges, 82 Cal. App. 3d 976, 147 Cal. Rptr. 471
(4th Dist. 1978), hearing denied, Sept. 14, 1978. A wife failed to
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assert a claim for her community property interest in her husband's military retirement benefits at the time of dissolution proceedings. She later filed suit to claim that interest. The trial court
sustaining the husband's demurrer, and following Kelley u.
Kelley, 73 Cal. App. 3d 672, 141 Cal. Rptr. 33 (4th Dist. 1977),
held that the doctrine of res judicata barred the wife from asserting such claim. The court of appeal reversed following the holding
in Lewis u. Superior Court, 77 Cal. App. 3d 844, 144 Cal. Rptr. 1
(3rd Dist. 1978) that res judicata does not apply. The Court noted
that these earlier appellate decisions were irreconcilable on the
issue raised, and recommended that the husband in the instant
case seek review in the Supreme Court.
Fenn u. Harris, 91 Cal. App. 3d 772, 154 Cal. Rptr. 21 (4th
Dist. 1979). Eight years after dissolution proceedings in which the
community 'property had been divided, a woman brought an action to partition her former husband's vested, matured military
pension and his unvested state retirement benefits. The trial
court granted summary judgment to the husband on the grounds
of res judicata.
The court of appeal reversed based on the facts that 1) the
property settlement agreement which had been incorporated into
the dissolution judgment expressly provided that community
property rights not mentioned in the agreement could be dealt
with later and 2) at the time of the agreement it had not been
legally determined that the benefits in question were community
property, as was later decided In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal.
3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
4.

Husband's Fiduciary Duty

In re Marriage of Connolly, 23 Cal. 3d 590, 591 P .2d 911, 153
Cal. Rptr. 423 (1979). The trial court denied a wife's motion to
reopen the interlocutory and final judgments of dissolution of her
marriage pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473. This
section allows for relief from a judgment made against a party
through mistake or excusable neglect when there is proof of fraud.
The parties had substantial community interest in a corporation
of which the husband was a director. The wife based her claim of
fraud on the fact that, upon valuation of their stock at dissolution, her husband failed to advise her that a public sale which
would greatly increase the value of the stock was planned.
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The court of appeal upheld the trial court's determination
that the husband had not breached any fiduciary duty as a director since: 1) the public offering of the stock had been published
in newspapers; 2) a cursory examination of the stocks background
by the wife or her attorney would have revealed the information;
and 3) the husband testified that he had, in fact, mentioned the
proposed sale to his wife. As to any separate fiduciary duty arising
from the marital relationship, the court of appeal sustained the
trial court's finding that the relationship had clearly become adversarial upon filing for dissolution, thus ending any fiduciary
obligation which might otherwise have existed.

5.

Valuation of Community Property in Bifurcated Proceeding
•

In re Marriage of Walters, 91 Cal. App. 3d 535,154 Cal. Rptr.
180 (4th Dist. 1979). In a bifurcated dissolution proceding the
trial court: 1) valued the community residence at fifty thousand
dollars, its value at the time of the independent proceeding for
the division of community property, and 2) ordered the parties to
sell the home and divide the proceeds equally. At the time of the
proceedings to dissolve the marriage two years earlier, the house
was worth approximately twenty-six thousand dollars and the
wife and child had since lived in the residence and made all the
payments on the house.
The court of appeal affIrmed the trial court's determination
that: 1) the property should be valued at the time of trial on the
division of property rather than at the earlier dissolution proceeding pursuant to Civil Code § 4800(a); and 2) since the increased
value of the house had resulted from inflation and market fluctuation as opposed to any personal efforts, both parties should
share equally in the profits.

6.

Tenancy In Common As Alternative to Promissory Note

In re Marriage of Herrmann, 84 Cal. App. 3d 361, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 550 (2nd Dist. 1978). The trial court, in a dissolution proceeding, awarded the family residence to the wife for the benefit
of the minor child in her custody and, in order to equalize the
community property distribution, ordered the wife to give the
husband a promissory note for one-half the market value of the
house minus the outstanding encumbrance. The note was to yield
seven percent (7%) simple interest annually and was to be paid
upon sale of the property, at such time as certain enumerated
contingencies occurred.
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While the court of appeal upheld the right of the trial court
to award the family residence to the custodial parent as a form
of child support, it found as reversible error the lower court's
contention that the promissory note equalized the distribution of
property. Responding to evidence that the note, if sold, would
have to be discounted by forty percent (40%) of fifty percent
(50%) due to all its contingencies, the court determined that a
more just alternative would be to place the property in a tenancy
in common with each spouse retaining an undivided one-half
interest until such time as the property was sold.
7.

Distribution of Out of State Property

t In re Marriage of Fink, 92 Cal. App. 3d 270, 155 Cal. Rptr.
47 (2nd Dist. 1979), hearing. granted, July 12, 1979. In a dissolution proceeding the parties held real property in Florida which
exceeded the value of all other community assets. The trial court
awarded certain of the Florida real property to the husband and
the remainder to the wife and also awarded the couple's personal
residence in California to the wife. The trial court later granted
the husband's motion for new trial.
The court of appeal affirmed the grant of a new trial and
found error in the trial court's division of the property. While it
would have been permissible to divide up the property in this
manner had the out of state assets been equal to or less than the
other community property assets, since the out of state assets
exceeded the value of other community property, Civil Code section 4800 required an equal, in-kind distribution of the out of
state interests. The trial court should, therefore, have ordered the
husband to convey a one-half interest in all the Florida property
to his wife. In addition, the court of appeal found that the husband should have been awarded an equal share in the California
residence since there were no circumstances (such as minor children living in the home) to warrant an exception to the equal
division requirement.

t Since the California Supreme Court has granted a hearing in this case, the court of
appeal opinion is of no force or effect and is no longer an authoritative statement of any
principle oflaw. 5 CAL. JUR. 2d, Appellate Review § 434 (1952), citing Knouse v. Nimocks,
8 Cal. 2d 482, 66 P.2d 438, (1937). Four such cases appear in this Survey for the sole
purpose of familiarizing the reader with issues presently pending before the high court.
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CHILD CUSTODY AND CONTROL

1. Standard of Proof for Termination of or Interference with
Parental Rights

In re Terry D., 83 Cal. App. 3d 890, 148 Cal. Rptr. 221 (3rd
Dist. 1978). Civil Code section 232 subdivision (a)(2) provides
that a child may be declared free from parental control and custody when the child has been cruelly treated or neglected. Civil
Code section 232 subdivision (a)(7) provides for termination of
parental rights after foster care for two or more consecutive years,
if the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that return of the
child to the parents would be detrimental and that the parents
had failed in the past and were likely to fail in the future to
maintain an adequate relationship with the child.

In a proceeding to declare six children free from parental
control pursuant to Civil Code section 232, the trial court found
by a preponderance of the evidence that all the children had been
neglected within the meaning of section 232 subdivision (a)(2).
The court of appeal reversed and ordered the trial court to reconsider its findings using a standard of "clear and. convincing"
proof. The court held on the basis of recent California decisions,
that when severance of parental custody is at issue, the higher
standard is required. In re B. G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 523 P .2d 244, 114
Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974); In re Christopher B., 82 Cal. App. 3d 608,
147 Cal. Rptr. 390 (3rd Dist. 1978).
The court further held that there is no denial of equal protection to have different standards of proof for sections 232(a)(2) and
232(a)(7). The former section involves a single and simple finding
of cruel treatment whereas the latter involves findings of detriment to the child, plus findings of past and likely future failings
of the parent(s) to a) provide a home, b) provide care and control,
and c) maintain an adequate parental relationship. To require a
more stringent standard of proof for more serious and complex
findings is rationally related to the legislative purpose in making
such a classification and therefore constitutionally sound.
Finally, the court held that to satisfy the requirement of 232
subdivision (a)(7) concerning past parental failings, it is proper
to consider conduct during the time before a child is placed in a
foster home as well as conduct during the two or more years after
such placement.
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In re Lynna B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 682, 155 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1st
Dist. 1979), hearing denied, July 19, 1979. In an action brought
under Civil Code section 232 subdivision (a)(7) the trial court
granted the petition of foster parents to declare a six year old girl
free from the custody and control of her natural parents. Evidence showed that, at the mother's suggestion, the child had been
placed with petitioners shortly after birth and the mother had
maintained only minimal contact with the child thereafter. Although the mother could provide a house for the child, the trial
court found that the child had never been in the house and had
"put down deep roots" with the foster parents.
The court of appeal affirmed, holding that there was sufIicient evidence, including testimony by psychiatrists and social
service practitioners, that returning the child to her mother would
be detrimental. The court also held that the failure of the trial
court to consider less severe alternatives, such as child protective
services, did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to grant the
petition. There was evidence to support implied findings that
such services were considered, but rejected since efforts at reunification were likely to be unproductive.

In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1st
Dist. 1979); modified on denial of rehearing, 93 Cal. App. 3d
10lOe, hearing denied, July 19, 1979. The juvenile probation
department filed a petition under Welfare and Institution Code
section 300, subdivision (b) alleging that a twelve year old boy
was not being provided with the necessities of life because his
parents refused to consent to cardiac surgery for a congenital
defect. The court dismissed the petition because medical testimony indicated a higher-than-average risk of post-operative complications since the boy also suffered from Down's Syndrome.
The court of appeal concurred holding that, although the
state has a right to protect children, there must be clear and
convincing evidence that the child is not being provided with the
necessities of life before the state can substitute its judgment
about medical care for that of the parents. The court enumerated
the relevant factors. In this case, the court found that there was
substantial evidence to support the trial court's dismissal in view
of the risk to the child in having surgery.
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2. Termination of Parental Custody Due to Mother's Mental
Disability
In re Heidi T., 87 Cal. App. 3d 864, 151 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1st
Dist. 1978). Pursuant to Civil Code section 232 (a)(6), two minor
wards of the court, ages eleven and twelve years old, were declared to be free of parental custody and control and referred to
the Department of Social Services for adoptive placement. The
minors had lived for ten years with foster parents who wished to
adopt them. The trial court found that as a result of the mother's
mental disability, it would be detrimental to return custody of
the children to her.
The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the appropriate
standard of proof was "clear and convincing evidence" and that
even though the record was silent as to which standard was employed, on review the court found substantial evidence to support
the trial court's conclusions. The court further held that testimony of two psychiatrists constituted sufficient evidence to support the finding that the mother's continuing mental illness rendered her incapable of providing support for the children. The
court also held that the statutory test under Civil Code section
232(a)(6) sanctioning termination of parental custody was not
unconstitutionally vague. Finally, the court found that the trial
court complied with the statutory mandate to consider less drastic means prior to terminating the parent-child relationship.

In re David B., 91 Cal. App. 3d 184, 154 Cal. Rptr. 63 (5th
Dist. 1979). A child was forever freed from the custody and control of his mother pursuant to Civil Code section 232 subdivision
(a)(6) which allows for termination of the parental relationship
where the parent is mentally ill and will remain so as testified to
by two physicians.
The court of appeal affirmed, holding that Civil Code section
232 subdivision (a)(6) does not violate substantive due process
provided that 1) the mental illness is settled and will, in the
opinion of two physicians, continue indefinitely regardless of
medical treatment, 2) the parent is given an opportunity to challenge any reports upon which the decision to terminate the relationship is based, and 3) the severance of the relationship is found
to be the least detrimental alternative available for the welfare
of the child.
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Grounds for Setting Aside an Adoption

Adoption of Jason R., 88 Cal. App. 3d 11, 151 Cal. Rptr. 501
(2nd Dist. 1979). A stepfather moved to set aside his previous
stepparent adoption on the ground that the adoption had been
fraudulently induced by the natural mother's misrepresentation
as to her willingness to bear his children. Prior to the instant
action, the stepfather had successfully sought an annulment of
the marriage based on extrinsic fraud. The trial court denied the
motion, without considering the best interests of the child, on the
ground that the stepfather had failed to sustain his burden on the
issue of fraud.
The court of appeal reversed and remanded for a hearing on
the issue of the best interests of the child holding that this alone
could constitute sufficient grounds for setting aside an adoption.
The court further held that the prior determination of fraud in
the inducement of marriage in the annulment proceedings was a
different issue than the fraud alleged here and hence the doctrine
of collateral estoppel was inapp1icabl~. Finally, the court held
that although annulment has the effect of rendering the marriage
void ab initia, and "relates back," the decree will not be applied
to invalidate the stepparent and stepson relationship created by
a stepparent adoption.

4. Joint Custody
In re Marriage of Neal, 92 Cal. App. 3d 834, 155 Cal. Rptr.
157 (1st Dist. 1979). In a marriage ·dissolution proceeding, the
trial court awarded physical custody of the two minor children to
the mother and joint legal custody to both parents. The husband,
who was ordered to pay child support, could claim the children
as dependants for tax purposes. In addition, the court awarded
spousal support to terminate on a specific date without reserving
jurisdiction over the matter.
The court of appeal affirmed that part of the judgment allowing the father to claim the children as tax dependants but modified the other' provisions of the order. In view of bitter disputes
between the parents over custody and visitation rights, the court
held that it was not in the best interests of the children to award
joint legal custody. Since the wife had health problems which
made her future ability to support herself questionable, the court
of appeal held that it was error for the trial court to relinquish
jurisdiction over the issue of spousal support.
Women's Law Forum
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Child Custody Disputes Involving More Than One State

In re Marriage of Kern, 87 Cal. App. 3d 402, 150 Cal. Rptr.
860 (1st Dist. 1978). In a California dissolution proceeding, each
parent was awarded custody of one child; the father took custody
of their son and the mother took custody of their daughter. Mter
the father and son moved to Rhode Island, the son returned to
California for a visit with his mother. The mother then brought
an action to convert her visitation rights into permanent custoq.y.
The father brought a parallel action in Rhode Island. The California court refused to transfer the case to Rhode Island and
awarded permanent custody of the son to the mother. Thereafter,
the Rhode Island Court reached the opposite result.
On appeal by the father, the court of appeal reversed holding
that the California court should have stayed the proceedings to
permit final adjudication of the custody issue in Rhode Island
since there was no showing that the child's health or safety would
be jeopardized if he were returned to his father. Ferreira v.
Ferreira, 9 Cal. 3d 824,512 P.2d 304, 109 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1973); see
Civil Code sections 5150 et seq. (West Cum. Supp. 1979). The
court also held that although the California court had jurisdiction
in the matter, the trial court abused its discretion in modifying
custody where it did not make a finding that a change in custody
was in the best interests of the child and the court did not consider all available evidence in making its determination.

In re Marriage of Steiner, 89 Cal. App. 3d 363, 152 Cal. Rptr.
612 (4th Dist. 1979). A child custody decree originally issued in
California was modified at a Colorado hearing after the mother
and child had been living in Colorado for eight months. The
father in California petitioned for a modification of the Colorado
decree but the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Civil Code
section 5152, which gives jurisdiction to the child's home state or
state with a significant relationship to the child-now Colorado-prevails over the conflicting continuing jurisdiction provisions of Code of Civil Procedure 410.50 and Civil Code section
4600.
6.

Validity of Foreign Ex Parte Custody Orders

Miller v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 923, 587 P .2d 723, 151
Cal. Rptr. 6 (1978). A divorced woman who moved with her chil-
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dren from Australia to the United States, without notice to either
her former husband or the Australian Court which granted her
custody, was found in violation of the Australian custody decree
by the Los Angeles Superior Court. She was ordered to comply
with an Australian ex parte restraining order requiring that she
deliver custody to the husband. The wife appealed the decision
to the California Supreme Court claiming she had not been given
reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard at the Australian
proceeding.
The high court found that several unsuccessful attempts to
locate the wife had been made, notice of the hearing had been
given to her solicitors in Australia, a showing of irreparable harm
to the children had been made to the court, the orders contemplated only a temporary change of custody and the wife, learning
of the hearing within a month, had made no subsequent efforts
to reopen the Australian proceedings. As a result, the court held
that the wife had not been denied reasonable notice and that the
Australian orders were therefore valid and enforceable.

Neal v. Superior Court., 84 Cal. App. 3d 847, 148 Cal. Rptr.
841. (2nd Dist. 1978). A couple whose child was born in California
moved to Arkansas where they were divorced. Custody of the
child was awarded to the father by stipulation. However, the wife
violated this order and moved back to California with the child,
claiming that the child suffered serious allergies in Arkansas. The
trial court granted the mother's petition for temporary custody
where upon the father petitioned for writ of mandate to vacate
this order. Relying on Civil Code section 5152, the court of appeal
found that in order for a California Court to have jurisdiction, the
child must have some significant connection' with California. The
bringing of the child to California was insufficient. In vacating
the order ~anting custody to the mother, the court noted that the
legislative intent in enacting Civil Code Sec. 5152 was precisely
to discourage parents from violating custody orders by removing
the child to another state.
In re Marriage of Ben- Yehoshua, 91 Cal. App. 3d 259, 154
Cal. Rptr. 80 (5th Dist. 1979). Two weeks after she and her children .moved to California from Israel, a wife filed an action for
dissolution of marriage and child custody. The husband accepted
service of process when he came to California temporarily but
then returned to Israel and took the three children with him. The
Women's Law Forum
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California trial court granted the dissolution to the wife, awarded
her custody of the children, ordered the husband to pay child
support, costs and attorney's fees and also ordered the division
of some property in Israel.
The court of appeals reversed that part of the judgment
granting the wife custody and ordering the husband to pay child
support. The court held that personal jurisdiction over the parties
had been confused with subject matter jurisdiction over the custody issue. Since Civil Code sections 5150-5174 give subject matter jurisdiction over custody matters to the home state or state
with a significant relationship to the child, Israel, where the children had lived all their lives, was the proper place for custody
determinations.

In re Marriage of West, 92 Cal. App. 3d 120, 154 Cal. Rptr.
667 (4th Dist. 1979), hearing denied, July 19, 1979. Plaintiff and
his wife were divorced in England. Mter plaintiff moved to California, his wife sought and was granted upward modification of
the support decree in England. Plaintiff denied receiving notice
of the hearing and, at a California court trial where his divorce
was established as a California judgment, the trial court terminated spousal support and reduced child support.
The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the plaintiff had
not been given adequate notice of the British modification hearing either under California Code of Civil Procedure 1013, which
requires proof of service, or under British law which requires either acknowledgment by the party or inquiry by the Registrar. It
was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to terminate
spousal support since the husband had supported his wife for
fifteen years following a four year marriage and the child of the
marriage was almost grown.

7.

Effect of Prior Finding of Nonpaternity

Ruddock u. Ohls, 91 Cal. App. 3d 271, 154 Cal. Rptr. 87 (5th
Dist. 1979). Defendant moved to strike a complaint to establish
paternity brought on behalf of a minor child. Defendant claimed
that the issue had been fully litigated in an Oregon divorce proceeding and a finding of nonpaternity had been made. The trial
court granted the motion, finding that, although the child had
not been joined as a party in the divorce action, the mother had
represented the child's interests.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1978

33

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 12

678

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:645

The court of appeal reversed, holding that there was no showing that the independent rights of the child had been represented
in the divorce action and that, in the absence of joinder, such
rights should not be foreclosed by res judicata or collateral estoppel based on a judgment between the mother ~nd alleged father.

8. Adoption Without Consent of Noncustodial Parent
Adoption of Murray, 86 Cal. App .. 3d 222, 150 Cal. Rptr. 58
(4th Dist. 1978). The court of appeal upheld the trial court's
finding that Civil Code section 224 only allows for the adoption
of a child without the consent of the noncustodial parent if the
noncustodial parent has both failed to support and failed to communicate with the child for a period of one year. Failure to perform only one of these duties is insufficient grounds for denying
a natural parent the right to object to an adoption.
9.

Testimony of Dependent Children Out of Presence of Parent

In re Stanley F., 86 Cal. App. 3d 568, 152 Cal. Rptr. 5 (2nd
Dist. 1978). A mother's petition for rehearing of a disposition
proceeding that ordered her two children to remain under the
supervision of the Department of Public Social Services was denied by the Superior Court. The children had been declared dependent children in 1973, and they were placed in foster homes
where they had remained since that time.
The court of appeal affirmed the disposition order and de. nied the petition for rehearing holding that the referee did not
abuse his discretion when he excluded the other parties while one
child testified in chambers concerning whether he wished to live
with natural parents or foster parents. It was not improper since
counsel for all parties was present, the testimony was transcribed
by a reporter and the mother's attorney had the opportunity to
discuss with the mother the testimony given in chambers.
The court further held that the disposition order was supported by substantial evidence when three physicians were of the
opinion that the mother was not capable of caring for her children, the mother was uncooperative in obtaining treatment, the
children were doing better in foster homes than with their natural
parents, and past efforts to reunite the family had failed.
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SPOUSAL AND CHILD SUPPORT

Evidence of Parent's Living Situation in Action to Modify
Child Support

1.

In re Marriage of Fuller, 89 Cal. App. 3d 405, 152 Cal. Rptr.
467 (5th Dist. 1979). A father who was on medical retirement
following a stroke moved to reduce his child support obligation
to his three children of a former marriage. Over the father's objection, the trial court admitted evidence that the father was living
with a woman and her child by a previous marriage, and that the
couple had an arrangement for sharing living expenses. Evidence
of the woman's income and property was ~dmitted, but the trial
court excluded as irrelevant evidence of the expenses and obligations of the woman. The father's motion to modify child support
was denied.
The court of appeal affIrmed holding that there was no abuse
of discretion in admitting evidence of the combined income and
assets of the father and his nonmarital partner .. All factors relating to a person's living situation may be properly considered; the
existence and not the source of money or services available is the
relevant factor. Since the income of the nonmarital partner is
being used to reduce the expenses of the father, it in turn affects
his ability to pay child support. There was substantial evidence
to support the trial court's conclusion that the pooling of interests
resulted in a lessening of expenses on the part of the father. Finally, the expenses of the nonmarital partner were irrelevant and
properly excluded.

2. No Right to Jury Trial in Action to Fix Amount of Child
Support
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 86 Cal. App. 3d 732,150 Cal. Rptr. 423
(1st Dist. 1978). Petitioner appeals in propria persona from an
order to pay $100 child support pursuant to the provisions of the
Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA), contending that he was denied his constitutional right to
a jury trial. The issue in the case was whether defendant had an
obligation to pay child support, and, if so, the amount; paternity
was not at issue.
The court of appeal affIrmed holding that fIxing the amount
of support, under Civil Code section 4700 subd. (a), is a proceed-
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ing equitable in nature (Kyne v. Kyne, 38 Cal. App. 2d 122, 133,
100 P .2d 806, 812 (1940» and that a jury trial is not available in
actions in equity. The court further held that petitioner was not
denied his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
when the judge ordered him to testify since it applies only to
criminal actions.

3. Pendente Lite Awards May be Ordered in Child Support
Actions
City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court (Posada,
Mack and Pressley), 86 Cal. App. 3d 87, 150 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1st
Dist. 1978). In three separate paternity actions by the City and
County of San Francisco, as assignee of its AFDC welfare recipients, against the putative fathers, the trial court, without evidentiary hearing for a preliminary determination of paternity, denied
plaintiff's motion for orders requiring the putative fathers to pay
child support, attorney fees and costs pendente lite.
The court of appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate
directing the superior court to set aside its orders and upon motion by petitioner to reconsider the propriety of issuing such pendente lite awards. The court held that Civil Code section 196a,
which provides for bringing a civil suit to enforce child support
against a mother or father on behalf of a child, will be governed
by the same provisions as apply in dissolution actions. In dissolution proceedings, Civil Code section 4357 specifically grants the
trial court the power to require pendente lite payments of child
support, attorney fees and costs. Therefore Civil Code section
4357 shall be applicable in civil suits to enforce child support
payments pendente lite. The court also held that the fact that the
pendente lite award primarily benefits the city and county instead of the custodial parent was of no significance.

4.

Paternity In Issue

Bartlett v. Superior Court (County of Santa Barbara), 86
Cal. App. 3d 72, 150 Cal. Rptr. 25 (2nd Dist. 1978). In an action
by the County of Santa Barbara to seek reimbursement for welfare funds used to support a minor child from the alleged father,
a nonresident of California, the superior court denied defendant's
motion to quash service of summons. The court of appeal granted
a writ of mandate setting aside the superior court's order and
quashed service. The court held that in personam jurisdiction
Women's Law Forum
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could not be validly predicated upon the mother's claim that the
defendant caused the pregnancy and paid certain expenses in
connection with the pregnancy when the defendant denied paternity. The mother seeking to collect child support must first
prove the disputed fact of paternity in a court having jurisdiction
over the defendant.
The court further held that Florida's practice of not applying
its uniform reciprocal support act to cases in which paternity was
in issue did not require the alleged father to defend in California.
In re Marriage of Johnson, 88 Cal. App. 3d 848, 152 Cal. Rptr.
121 (2nd Dist. 1979). In a dissolution of marriage proceeding the
trial court denied child support to the wife based on the fact that
the husband was not the child's natural father. The court of appea~ reversed, holding that the husband was estopped from asserting the child's illegitimacy since, from the time of the child's
birth and for the six years of the marriage, the husband, by his
conduct, impliedly represented to the child that he was his father
and intended for the child to accept and act on this representation.
People v. Thompson, 89 Cal. App. 3d 193, 152 Cal. Rptr. 478
(4th Dist. 1979). During a prosecution for failure to support his
minor son under Penal Code section 270, defendant attempted to
introduce evidence casting doubt on his biological paternity. The
trial court sustained the People's objection under Evidence Code
section 621 which provides that a child born of a woman cohabitating with her husband is conclusively presumed to be a child
of the marriage unless the husband is impotent or sterile.
The court of appeal affirmed, holding that, while paternity
is an essential element of the crime charged and every element
of a criminal charge must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
proof of biological parenthood is not necessary since the determining factor under Penal Code section 270 is whether the legal
relationship of father and child exists.
5.

Commencement of the Obligation

In re Marriage of Pearce, 84 Cal. App. 3d 221, 148 Cal. Rptr.
509 (1st Dist. 1978). In marriage dissolution proceedings, a husband's obligation for child support commenced as of the time the
trial court pronounced the order for support in open court, and
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not when the court subsequently signed and filed its formal order.
The court of appeal affirming the trial court order reasoned that
since an order for spousal support is operative from the moment
of pronouncement, a child's right to support should be afforded
the same disposition. Further, the court held the wife's request
for attorney's fees in connection with this appeal should be addressed to the trial court.

6. Continuing Jurisdiction to Modify Support Obligations and
Reimbursement For Separate Property Expenditures
In re Marriage of Epstein, 24 Cal. 3d 76, 592 P .2d 1165, 154
Cal. Rptr. 413 (1979), modified, 24 Cal. 3d 501a. In a divorce
proceeding, the court resolved issues of reimbursement of separate property expenditures and continuing jurisdiction to modify
support awards. In this marriage of eighteen years, the wife had
not been employed since before the marriage and lacked the ability to provide for her financial needs in the future. Under these
circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion by terminating its jurisdiction at the same time as the termination of support
payments.
The court held inapplicable the rule of See v. See, 64 Cal. 2d
778, 415 P.2d 776, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966) which makes a party
who uses separate property for community purposes ineligible for
reimbursement absent express agreement. In this case since the
expenditure of separate property was post-separation, reimbursement for expenses to maintain the family residence could be
awarded unless the expenditures were in discharge of a support
obligation. The court remanded for a trial court finding as to
whether the expenditure fell within this exception. Additionally,
the court held that the community was entitled to reimbursement
for community funds used to pay the husband's tax liability for
his separate income.
Finally, the court instructed the trial court to consider, upon
remand, the capital gains tax liability which would be incurred
upon sale of the family residence, since the sale was a direct result
of the court's community property division.

Gammell v. Gammell, 90 Cal. App. 3d 90,153 Cal. Rptr. 169
(2nd Dist. 1979). A husband applied to the court to modify an
interlocutory decree as to spousal support on the grounds that his
ability to pay had decreased as a result of retirement and his
Women's Law Forum
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wife's need had decreased due to her part-time job and the appreciation of her property. The court denied relief on the grounds
that: 1) the wife adequately demonstrated that she still needed
the support originally ordered and 2) the husband's second wife's
contribution of her income and assets made up for income lost
through retirement.
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court
properly considered the financial benefits accompanying the husband's second marriage in determining his continuing ability tD
pay support.
7. Collection Re"!-edies After Remarriage: Scope of Judicial Inqwry
In re Marriage of Barnes, 83 Cal. App. 3d 143, 147, Cal.
Rptr.710 (1st Dist. 1978). Probate Code section 205 provides that
a surviving spouse is personally liable for the debts of his or her
deceased spouse which are chargeable against their community
property. The decedent's former wife invoked that statute to collect unpaid spousal support due her under the dissolution judgment. She obtained a writ of execution on the judgment and
levied on the community property of the decedent and his second
wife. The writ was issued by a clerk without exercise of j\ldicial
discretion. The trial court ordered the writ quashed on the ground
that the former wife was required to proceed in a separate action.
The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the writ should not
have been issued without judicial inquiry into the extent of personalliability of the second wife. However, the court disapproved
the lower court's ruling that a separate action was required, and
instead held that such inquiry could be conducted on the former
wife's application for the writ of execution in the dissolution proceeding.
8.

Reasonableness of Spousal Support Award

In re Marriage of Winick, 89 Cal. App. 3d 525,152 Cal. Rptr.
635 (2nd Dist. 1979). In a proceeding dissolving a twenty-six year
marriage, the trial court ordered the husband to pay one hundred
dollars per month spousal support for six months and one dollar
per month thereafter. The court based its decision on the fact
that: 1) the wife would also have five-hundred and eighty-four
dollars. a month investment income while the husband would
have four-hundred and seven dollars per month; 2) the wife's
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earning capacity was improving while the husband's was declining; 3) the husband was also paying one-hundred and fifty dollars
child support per month for each of two children; and 4) the
seventeen thousand dollar yearly income of the wife and two children would be more than two-thirds of what the family income
was prior to dissolution.
The court of appeal found that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in making this award though the case was remanded
to determine whether or not the judgment conformed with the
stipulation between the parties.
9.

Effect of Husband's Overpayment on Future Claim

In re Marriage of Peet, 84 Cal. App. 3d 974, 149 Cal. Rptr.
108 (4th Dist. 1978). A divorced husband who paid court-ordered
child support for twelve years, including an overpayment of
$1205, ceased making payments when his wife moved to another
state with their son. Three years later, after the son joined the
military, the wife attempted to collect the unpaid support of
$1485. Although the purpose of the husband's overpayments was
unclear, the trial court found that he should be given credit for
them. In an attempt to consider "the equitable factor," the court
noted since the wife had not attempted to collect this unpaid
support earlier, the child had not been harmed financially. The
court of appeal affirmed and ordered the husband to pay only the
difference between his overpayment and the unpaid support.
10. Duty to Reimburse for State Aid After Illegally Removed
From Custody
Richards v. Gibson, 90 Cal. App. 3d 877, 153 Cal. Rptr. 561
(1st Dist. 1979). Mter a Utah divorce decree gave the mother
custody of two minor children, the father moved to California. He
was later joined by the children who were sent to live with him
by the wife who was having problems with her second marriage.
The father obtained a decree awarding him custody but shortly
thereafter the wife refused to return the children to him following
a holiday visit in Utah. Despite numerous efforts by the husband,
the wife kept the children in Utah and began receiving public
assistance to support them.
In an action under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act (Code of Civil Procedure section 1650 et seq.) the
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trial court ordered the father to reimburse the state of Utah for
the welfare payments. The court of appeal reversed, holding that
Civil Code section 207 makes a parent liable for necessities provided to his child by a third person only if he is neglectful in
providing such necessities to the child himself. The court held
that the father should not be liable in this case because: 1) the
father had been awarded custody before the welfare funds were
expended; 2) the welfare payments were necessary only because
the wife illegally kept the children in Utah without means to
support them; 3) the husband made every effort to bring the
children back to California where he could provide them with
food and shelter; and 4) there was no showing the father knew of
the welfare payments.

F.

HEALTH AND WELFARE IsSUES

1.

Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege

Huelter v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 87 Cal.
App. 3d 544, 151 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1st Dist. 1978). In a dissolution
proceeding, the trial court granted husband's motion ordering
production of all medical records in possession of all physicians
who had treated his wife during their thirteen-year marriage.
Wife had raised the issue of her physical health which allegedly
prevented her from working, but she denied any disability based
on mental condition. Since her internist had in his possession
records of her psychiatrist, wife objected to the order on the
ground that compliance with it violated her psychotherapistpatient privilege.
The Court of Appeal issued a preemptory writ of mandate
compelling the trial court to set aside its order. The court held
that the wife raised only the issue of physical health and not
mental health, and that the husband failed to make any showing,
beyond mere speculation, that there might be any connection
between his wife's psychiatric treatment and her ability to work.
Thus, the order permitted the husband to obtain records in violation of the privilege protecting such communications. The mere
exchange of records between her physician and psychotherapist
in the normal course of medical treatment did not constitute a
waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.

2. Involuntary Sterilization
Guardianship of Tulley, 83 Cal. App. 3d 698, 146 Cal. Rptr.
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266 (1st Dist. 1978) hearing denied, Oct. 4, 1978. The Court of
Appeal affirmed a lower court order denying a petition brought
by a guardian for the involuntary sterilization of a severely mentally retarded woman. The court held that the only statutory
authority for ordering a person to be sterilized requires the person
be committed or admitted to a state hospital for the mentally
disordered or retarded. Welfare and Institutions Code section
7254. The woman was not so committed. Thus, absent a specific
statutory provision, the court was without authority despite its
belief, that in this case sterilization was justified medically and
socially, and was in the best interests of the woman.
The court further held that the refusal to grant the petition
did not violate the woman's constitutional right to privacy. On
the contrary, where fundamental rights are involved, as in this
case, the state is mandated to provide adequate procedural safeguards to avoid potential abuses.

3.

Fraudulently Obtaining AFDC For Non-existent Children

People v. Davis, 85 Cal. App. 3d 916,149 Cal. Rptr. 777 (2nd
Dist. 1978). Defendant appealed from a conviction of fraudulently obtaining aid from the county for non-existent children in
violation of Welfare and Institutions Code section 11483. The
court of appeal affirmed the conviction holding that section 11483
covers false representations to obtain aid for a non-existent child
as well as such representations for an existing child not entitled
to such aid.
The court also held that evidence in the form of a letter from
the county send one month before prosecution informing the defendant that she had been overpaid and requesting that she contact a welfare investigator to discuss a plan to make restitution,
satisfied the statutory requirement that the government seek restitution as a condition precedent to prosecution for welfare fraud.
People v. McGee, 19 Cal. 3d 948, 969 n.10, 568 P .2d 382, 393 n.10,
140 Cal. Rptr. 657, 668 n.10 (1977).

4.

No Reduction For Loan After Wrongful Denial of AFDC

Burch v. Prod, 90 Cal. App. 3d 987, 153 Cal. Rptr. 751 (4th
Dist. 1979). An applicant who was wrongfully denied Aid to Families With Dependant Children was given the retroactive aid by
administrative decision but a reduction was made for a loan she
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took out to cover expenses during the period following the wrongful denial. The trial court denied the plaintiffs petition for writ
of mandate. The court of appeal reversed and directed the trial
court to order the payments to be made without reduction, holding that a loan obtained under such circumstances cannot be
considered income for the purposes of reducing the aid.

5. Physician's Liability for Injury Caused by Intrauterine Device
Tresemer v. Barke, 86 Cal. App. 3d 656, 150 Cal. Rptr. 384
(2nd Dist. 1978). A woman brought suit for willful misconduct
and medical malpractice against a physician for injuries she allegedly sustained as a result of the insertion of a Dalkon Shield
intrauterine device three and one-half years earlier. The trial
court granted the physician's motion for summary judgment on
the grounds that: 1) the statute of limitations had run, 2) the
action was without merit and 3) the plaintiff had presented no
triable issues of fact.
The court of appeal reversed noting that both Code of Civil
Procedure section 340.5, which governs medical negligence
claims, and Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision 3,
which governs personal injury actions based on willful misconduct, contemplate that ~he limitation periods begin to run whep
the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the injury.
Therefore, although the device was inserted in 1972, plaintiffs
claim that she did not discover the cause of her injury unti11975
should not be summarily dismissed.
The court of appeal held that the defendant's pleadings
showed that at the time of the insertion, the Dalkon Shield was
one of the most popular and acceptable intrauterine devices on
the market and thus were sufficient to negate any charges of
willful misconduct or medical negligence. However, summary
judgment was improper since the defendant had a duty to warn
the plaintiff when he subsequently learned of the dangers associated with usage of the device, and therefore plaintiff had stated
a cause of action for common negligence and malpractice.

G.
1.

DISSOLUTION PROCEEDINGS

Determination of Division of Community Assets
In re Marriage of Afmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. 'Rptr.
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668 (1st Dist. 1979) modified on denial of rehearing, 90 Cal. App.
3d 518e. In a dissolution proceeding, the trial court entered an
interlocutory judgment dissolving the marriage, determined the
division of community assets, awarded spousal and child support,
and also awarded the wife $3500 in attorney's fees. The wife appealed and the husband cross-appealed from certain provisions of
the judgment.
The court of appeal affirmed. The court held that the down
payment on the parties' residence which was at the time of
prchase made from wife's separate property continued to be her
separate property. However, the remainder of the purchase price,
obtained by a loan, was paid from community funds. The
amounts of separate and community funds were ascertainable
and the trial court properly computed the division of interests on
a pro rata basis. The court further held that $1,000 per month in
spousal support was not inadequate, and that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in failing to order automatic termination
of spousal support at the end of some reasonable period of time.
The court rejected claims that it was error to: 1) exclude evidence
regarding the value of husband's legal education as a community
asset; 2) to exclude good will as a valuation factor of the husband's interest in the law firm; and 3) to award attorney's fees.

In re Marriage of Barnert, 85 Cal. App. 3d 413,149 Cal. Rptr.
616 (2nd Dist. 1978). In a dissolution proceeding, the trial court
awarded the husband's medical practice to him and the family
home to the wife. On appeal by the husband, the court remanded
the case for redetermination of the community property division
and a reevaluation of the medical practicEt. The court instructed
the trial court to consider the date of separation and the application of the Van Camp-Pereira formula in reverse to determine the
value of the medical practice. In so doing, the court reaffirmed
the holding of In re Marriage of Imperato, 45 Cal. App. 3d 432,
119 Cal. Rptr. 590 (2nd Dist. 1975), which made any portion of
the value of the business attributable to the earnings of the working spouse while sep~ated, his separate property.
2. Bifurcation of Dissolution Judgment From Litigation of
Property and Support Rights
In re Marriage of Lush, 86 Cal. App. 3d 228, 150 Cal. Rptr.
63 (4th Dist. 1978). In a dissolution proceeding, the husband
moved to bifurcate the trial and for entry of judgment of dissoluWomen's Law Forum
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tion prior to litigation of support and property rights. The wife
contended that the court would lose jurisdiction over the support
and property issues under this procedure and that it would prejudice her community property rights and lead to adverse tax consequences. The trial court entered an interlocutory judgment of
dissolution expressly reserving jurisdiction over the property and
support issues.
The court of appeal affirmed holding that the trial court was
authorized by the Family Law Act (Civil Code section 4000 et.
seq.), augmented by the Judicial Council rules, not only to bifurcate the trial, but to enter a separate interlocutory jUdgment of
dissolution before other issues had been litigated. The court further held that the wife's community property rights would not be
prejudiced by the judgment of dissolution entered before the
property and support rights were litigated and that any adverse
tax consequences were purely speculative.
Finally, the court held that, even if the wife's contentions
were correct, the husband would be estopped from asserting any
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court to make subsequent
orders for support, property division, attorney fees and any other
necessary orders.

3.

Wife's Acquisition of Husband's Privileged Documents

Cooke v. Superior Court, 83 Cal. App. 3d 582, 147 Cal. Rptr.
915 (2d Dist. 1978) hearing denied, Oct. 12, 1978. During the
pendancy of a marriage dissolution, certain documents which the
husband intended to share only with his attorney, business associates and family were secretly copied by a servant and given to
the wife who turned them over to her attorney. Finding the documents to be privileged and confidential, the trial court ordered
them to be delivered to the husband's attorney. However, the
court denied the husband's motion that the wife's attorney be
disqualified from the case. The court of appeal upheld the court's
determination that the wife's attorney should not be disqualified
but modified the lower court's order concerning disposal ·of the
documents. In the court's view, delivery of the documents to the
husband's attorney went beyond what was necessary to protect
the husband's privilege. Instead, the wife was ordered to deliver
the documents to the clerk of the court where they would be under
seal and available if any of them were privileged.
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Reasonableness of Attorney's Fees

In re Marriage of Cueva, 86 Cal. App. 3d 290, 149 Cal. Rptr.
918 (4th Dist. 1978). At a default hearing in a marriage dissolution, the trial court awarded the wife's attorney sixteen thousand
dollars in fees bringing the total award of attorney's fees to
twenty-one thousand dollars. The court accepted the wife's argument that this fee was justified because: 1) the length of the
marriage had been twenty-two and one half years; 2) there had
been considerable difficulty with discovery; and 3) the award was
less than three percent of the value of the estate which amounted
to one million dollars.
The court of appeal ruled that, although determinations as
to the propriety of attorney's fees in dissolution proceedings are
within the discretion of the trial court, there were insufficient
grounds for an award of twenty one thousand dollars. Factors
besides the size of the estate which must be taken into account
include the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the skill required, the attention given to the case, the attorney's learning,
age and experience, the time involved and the scope of the responsibilities undertaken.
H.
1.

PATERNITY ACTIONS

Indigent's Right to Counsel in State's Paternity Suits

Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr.
529 (1979). In two separate paternity actions, one prosecuted by
the district attorney in the name of the mother who was on welfare and the other prosecuted by the district attorney as guardian
of ad litem for the minor child, defendants claimed to be indigent
and requested appointed counsel. The trial court refused and in
each case the defendant was found to be the father and ordered
to pay child support.
The California Supreme Court reversed both judgments and
ordered the trial court to appoint counsel if the defendants could
prove their indigency. The court held that counsel must be appointed for indigent defendants in all paternity suits in which the
state is a party or appears on behalf of the mother or child.
2.

Blood Tests Excluded in Establishing Paternity

Dodd v. Henkel, 84 Cal. App. 3d 604, 148 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1st
Dist. 1978). In an action to establish paternity and support for a
Women's Law Forum
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child born out of wedlock, the court of appeal affirmed the trial
court's exclusion of evidence of defendant's blood type offered to
show that statistically he could be the putative father. The appellate court held that evidence merely reflecting that defendant was
included within the blood type ~oup (15% of the population)
consistent with paternity lacked probative value and, in any
event, was likely to be unduly prejudicial. The court noted that
the Legislature in enacting the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to
Determine Paternity intended that blood-test evidence was admissible only for the purpose of excluding possible paternity.

3. Admissibility of Human Leucocyte Antigen (HLA) Test To
Establish Paternity
Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865
(4th Dist. 1979). In a paternity suit brought by the District Attorney, the jury verdict was in favor of defendant and judgment was·
entered decreeing defendant not the father of the child. The trial
judge had granted defendant's motion in limine to exclude results
of a human leucocyte antigen (HLA) test taken on blood samples
of the mother, father and child.
The court of appeal reversed, holding that California law
does not preclude use of HLA test results to prove paternity. The
test is based on tissue typing of white blood cells and results in
far higher probabilities of paternity than those yielded by any of
the red blood cell grouping tests.
The court also held that the trial judge erred in ruling that
the prejudicial effect of the statistical results of the test would
outweigh their probative value. The 98.3% probability that defendant was the father of the child rested on objective data and
statistical theory based on scientific research and experiment.
Moreover, absent a statutory mandate excluding highly probative
scientific evidence on the issue of paternity, policy considerations
for protecting children from stigma of illegitimacy and enforcing
parental responsibility to child support argue for broad inclusion
of such evidence.
Finally, the court held that the defendant was precluded
from raising for the first time on appeal the issue that plaintiff
failed to adduce sufficient evidence that HLA tests were accepted
in the relevant scientific community as proof of paternity. The
question of test reliability and its general acceptance in the com-
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munity presents a mixed question of law and fact and the court
declined to resolve the issue on appeal.

County of Fresno v. Superior Court (Williams), 92 Cal. App.
3d 133, 154 Cal. Rptr. 660 (5th Dist. 1979), hearing denied, June
27, 1979. In a paternity suit brought by Fresno County, the parties stipulated to an extended factor blood test which indicated
tpat there was a forty-seven percent probability that the defendant was the child's father. The county then sought more sophisticated human leucocyte antigen (HLA) testing, but the defendant opposed the motion and the trial court denied it. The county
then sought a writ of mandate directing the trial court to order
the testing.
The court of appeal issued the writ, rejecting the defendant's
. argument that the forty-seven percent probability factor had legally excluded him as the natural father. The court held that,
under Evidence Code section 893, the trial court in a civil paternity suit has no discretion to deny the HLA test where extended
factor blood testing has already taken place and the defendant
was not excluded by it. The moving party need not show good
cause since the existence of the more precise test is sufficient good
cause in itself.

4.

Prepayment of Blood Test Expenses for Indigent Prohibited

Michael B. v. Superior Court (County of Stanislaus), 86 Cal.
App. 3d 1006, 150 Cal. Rptr. 586 (5th Dist. 1978). The district
attorney brought a paternity action on behalf of a mother and
child receiving public assistance against an indigent defendant.
Defendant's motion for blood tests under Evidence Code section
892 was granted -by the trial court. The court also ordered the
district attorney to arrange for tests for the mother, child and
another man and ordered defendant's counsel to arrange defendant's test. The defendant and the other man were ordered to
share the costs of the blood tests.
On petition by defendant, the court of appeal issued a writ
of mandate ordering the superior court to appoint an expert to
conduct the blood tests pursuant to Evidence Code section 893,
to fix the expert's compensation and to order the county to pay
initially, subject to being later taxable to the parties as costs in
the action. (Evidence Code section 894.) The court held that since
Evidence Code sections 892 et seq. authorize prepayment by the
Women's Law Forum
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county for blood tests, it is error to require prepayment by an
indigent defendant.

5.

Limited Inquiry Into Mother's Sexual Involvement

Fults v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. App. 3d 899; 152 Cal. Rptr.
210 (1st Dist. 1979). In response to objections by the plaintiff in
a paternity suit, the trial court limited interrogatories concerning
her sexual relationships to a period of one year prior to' and one
year after the likely date of conception. Arguing that such inquiry
should cover a period no more than three months before or three
months after conception, the plaintiff petitioned the court of appeal on grounds that any broader inquiry was irrelevant and invaded her right of privacy.
The court of appeals issued a writ of mandate directing the
trial court to vacate its discovery order with regard to any inquiries beyond the possible period of conception. The court noted
that, while the broader inquiry could not be said to be irrelevant,
absent some affirmative showing that it was likely to uncover
material information, the mother's right of privacy outweighed its
utility.

m.
A.

LABOR LAW
WORKERS' COMPENSATION

Compensation Recoverable by Minor Child When Spouse
Elected Special Benefits
1.

Department of Corrections v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 23 Cal. 3d 197, 589 P .2d 853, 152 Cal. Rptr. 345
(1979). The widow of a correctional officer filed a workers' compensation claim for "special death benefits" under Government
Code section 21363 (Public Employees Retirement System). The
deceased's minor daughter also filed a claim for death benefits
under the Workers' Compensation law. Labor Code section 4701
et seq. Since the widow elected to claim "special death benefits" .
which are payable only to surviving spouses, the workers' compensation judge ruled that the child was precluded from claiming
benefits by Labor Code section 4707.·The Workers' Compensation
Appeals Board (WCAB) , on reconsideration, awarded a death
benefit to the child on the theory that Labor Code section 4707
could be construed to allow the child to receive at least the
amount she would have received if the award was made under the
Labor Code.
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The California Supreme Court, after finding the WCAB's
interpretation of section 4707 unreasonable, annulled the award
to the daughter and remanded for a determination of whether
there was good cause for granting an award under Labor Code
section 4704. The court held that after the widow elected to claim
special death benefits the clear language of section 4707 precluded an award to the child. Nevertheless, under Labor Code
section 4704, the WCAB had discretion in awarding death benefits. The court noted that it is improper to read these statutes
narrowly to strip death benefits from a minor child who also
happens to be the dependent of a public employee. Rather, Labor
Code section 4704 is properly construed liberally to authorize
payments to dependents denied death benefits under Labor Code
section 4707 and Government Code section 21364 if "good cause"
is shown.

2. Employee Shot By Husband On Her Job Entitled to Workers'
Compensation
Murphy v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 86 Cal.
App. 3d 996, 150 Cal. Rptr. 561 (5th Dist. 1978). The court of
appeal annulled the decision of the Workers Compensation Appeals Board that an employee whose husband shot her at her
place of employment was not entitled to compensation. At issue
in the case was whether the shooting arose out of the petitioners
employment. The court of appeal found the requisite connection
between the employment and the injury, based primarily on the
facts that the husband (1) greatly resented his wife's employment, (2) had threatened to kill 4er repeatedly in the presence of
her supervisors who nevertheless refused to grant her a transfer,
and (3) had made a specific threat to her employer the night
before the shooting which the employer failed to communicate to
petitioner.
3. Workers' Compensation Not Exclusive Remedy for Intentional Torts of Employer's Agents
Meyer v. Graphic Arts International Union, 88·Cal. App. 3d
176, 151 Cal. Rptr. 597, modified, 88 Cal. App. 3d 767f (2nd Dist.
1979). In an employee's action against her union and certain of
its agents and officers for assault, battery, false imprisonment
and rape, the plaintiff alleged that the employees responsible for
these acts were her employer's agents and had acted within the
scope of their agency. The trial court sustained the employer's
demurrer without leave to amend in the belief that the plaintiff's
Women's Law Forum

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol9/iss2/12

50

Gold and Whitney: California Law Survey

1978-1979]

,CALIFORNIA LAW SURVEY

695

exclusive remedy lay with the Workers' Compensation Appeals
Board.
The court of appeal reversed, holding that an employer can
be held liable in a civil action for assaults committed by his or
her agent. Since the complaint contained an allegation of actual
agency it was held to be sufficient to withstand a general demurrer.

B.

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

Removal of Wife From Planning Commission Due to Husband's Election to City Council

1.

Kimura v. Roberts, 89 Cal. App. 3d 871, 152 Cal. Rptr. 569
(3rd Dist. 1979) hearing denied, May 24, 1979. The trial court
ordered a city council to reinstate the plaintiff to her position on
the city planning commission from which she was removed when
her husband was elected to the city council.
The court of appeal reversed, holding that a planning commissioner serves at the pleasure of the appointing power and may
be terminated for any constitutional reason. Since decisions of
the planning commission are subject to review by the city council,
the court held that there would or could be actual bias or conflict
of interest or the appearance of it. The court further noted that,
contrary to the trial court's interpretation, the reason for plaintiff's removal from her position was her husband's election to city
council and not her exercise of her constitutional right to marry
her husband.

2.

Civil Service Affirmative Action

Dawn v. State Personnel Board, 91 Cal. App. 3d 588, 154 Cal.
Rptr. 186 (3rd Dist. 1979), hearing denied, June 8, 1979. The
court of appeal upheld the trial court's denial of a petition for
mandate by a civil service parole agent. The plaintiff was seeking
review of the State Parole Board's affirmation of a woman's job
promotion to which plaintiff allegedly should have been appointed. The court held that the evidence indicated that both the
male plaintiff and the woman were equally qualified for the promotion and that under those circumstances it was permissible to
choose the woman in an effort to further the goals of affirmative
action.
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LEGISLATION

1. Agency Use of Public Funds to Promote ERA
Miller v. Miller, 87 Cal. App. 3d 762, 151 Cal. Rptr. 197 (3rd
Dist. 1978). At issue in this case was what, if any, limitations
should be placed on the California Commission on the Status of
Women in their spending of public funds to promote ratification
of the Equal Rights Amendment. The position of the plaintiffs
was that, absent explicit legislative authorization, public agencies are forbidden to use public monies in promoting a partisan
position in an election campaign. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the grounds that plaintiffs
had not made an adequate showing that the Commission was
involved in impermissible electoral activities as opposed to permissible legislative lobbying.
The court of appeals disagreed, holding that what distinguishes lobbying from electoral activities is the audience to which
the activities are addressed. Here, plaintiffs made an adequate
showing that the Commission was involved in election campaigning. Since there was no explicit statutory authorization for the
commission to urge the public to support any legislative or constitutional measures, public funds could not be spent in any such
pursuit.
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